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STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH. 
Plaintif !-Respondent, 
Gase No. vs. 
STANLEY WAYNE BARAN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
11903 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The appellant, Stanley Wayne Baran, was convicted 
of robbery in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-38-4 
( 1953), before the Third District Court for Salt Lake 
County, Honorable Gordon R. Hall, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
'Dhe defendant-appellant was tried by a jury, found 
guilty and sentenced for committing the crime of robbery. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the decision of the District 
Court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent does not agree with the Statement of Facts 
set forth in Appellant's Brief (at ____ ), and therefore sets 
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forth its own statement as follows : 
On January 10, 1969, through a prearranged plan to 
commilt a robbery, (T. 126) Mr. Gerald Rose picked up 
Mr. Brfan Frazier and Mr. Stanley Wayne Baran (T. 125). 
The three stopped at a Beeline Station for gas ( T. 56) and 
went out looking for a car to steal (T. 136). Before find-
ing a car to steal, the three aJttempted several robberies, 
but none worked out (T. 136). The defendant and his two 
companions then stole Mr. Steve Parker's 1963 Ford (T. 
48), drove out to the same Beeline Station, broke a window 
and stole a transistor radio (T. 144). 
Shortly before 10 :00 p.m. the three decided to rob 
Smith's Independent Gas Station (T. 166). Mr. Baran, 
itJhe appellant, had worked at the gas station before ( T. 
60) ,.so Frazier and Rose went in fiirst (T. 166), Frazier with 
a gun, and Rose IWilth a Iug wrench, and forced the station 
a1Jtendant and his two friends to lay on their stomachs in 
ithe back room (T. 31). Baran then came :in and took the 
money from the cash register ( T. 117) whi'le Frazier took 
the aJttendant and his friends' wallets (T. 31). Then the 
three men fled. Baran knew hOlw to work the closed cash 
regi'Ster because he had worked there (T. 61). 
The three robbers went to Mr. Rose's house (T. 118) 
and gave Rose his share of fue robbery money and asked 
ih:im to hide the wallets (T. 87, 70, 71). Mr. Rose refu&ed 
.the wiallets, whereupon someone, wccording to Mrs. Rose's 
testimony, left the house and headed for the trailer (T. 
71). Later the poilice recovered the wallets in Mr. Rose's 
trailer (T. 100). 
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The appellant took the sit.and in own defense and 
ciaimed he could not have committed 1Jhe robbery because 
he wa.s at Lita Vilet's house wi'th her mother and fa11Jher 
(T. 197). However, Mrs. Rose testified th.art; Baran, along 
with Rose and Frazier, came to her house that Illight wit!h 
the robbery money and the stolen wallets (T. 71, 72), and 
Paul Rogers, a Salt Lake City policeman, testified that Mr. 
Baran was in the Salt Lake P<Ylice Station talking with 
him when appellant was isupposed !to be over at Lita Vilet's 
house (T. 223). To further substanrtiate this, Mr. Rogers 
personally typed a report of the conversation, stating tin 
the report the time and the date of the conversaJtJion (T. 
226). 
Miss Carmelita Burke also testified in court that ap-
pellant told her a couple of days after the robbery ithaJt Brian 
was the man \V'ith the gun and that he, Baran, also parlici-
pated in the robbery (T. 229). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING OF GUILT 
IS SUPPORTED BY THE ACCOMPLICE'S TES-
TIMONY AND IS CORROBORATED WITH 
SUBSTANTIAL INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE. 
The first point raised by appellant iis that there iis Il'O 
eviidence connecting him wi'bh ,the robbery, other than an 
accomplice's statement. Appellant contends ,that under 
Uta;h Code Ann. § 77-31-18 (1953) conviction cannot be 
had on testimony of an accomplice unless it is corroborated 
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by other evidence, and since there is supposedly no other 
evidence, the conviction was not warranted. 
Section 77-31-18 of the Utah Code Ann. (1953) 1·eads: 
"A conviction shall not be had on the testimony 
of ·an accomplice, un1less he is corroborated by other 
evidence, Which in itself and without the aid of the 
testimony of the accomplice tends to connect the 
defendant with the commission of the offense; and 
the corroboration shall nat be sufficient, lif it merely 
shows the commission of the offense ·or the circum-
stances thereof." 
In order to help interpret this statute, Utah judges 
have adopted some tests which have been used as guide-
lines in ruling on the statute. In State v. Sinclair, 15 Utah 
2d 162, 389 P. 2d 465 ( 1964) the court found the test 
to be: 
"Test of corroboration of accomplice is whether 
there is evidence, independent of accomplice's testi-
mony, which jury could reasonably believe tends to 
and connect the defendant with the com-
mission of the crime." Id. at 468. 
The cour.t also sarid : 
"In determining corroboration of accomplice; 
corrobo:mJtive evidence should be looked at separate 
and apart from his testimony to determine whether 
there is some independent evidence tending .to con-
nect defendant w1ith crime, but corroborative evi-
dence should be considered in relation 'to other facts 
shown." Id. at 469. 
See: State v. Simpson, 120 Utah 596, 236 P. 2d 1077 (1951), 
State v. Virgil, 123 Utah 495, 260 P. 2d 539 (1953), and 
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Strite V. Bruner, 106 Utah 49, 145 P. 2d 302 (1944). Most 
tests cited by the courts use the words implricate or connect 
the defendant and the crime. Applying that test to the 
p1·Psent ca'3e, there must be sufficient independent evidence 
to implicate or connect Mr. Baran, the appellant, with the 
c1·ime of robbing Smith's Independent Gas Station. 
The accused is found guilty or innocent, based on the 
evidence which connects or implicates him to the crime. 
If there is not sufficient evidence to connect and implicate 
the accused to the crime, he is free. Utah case law gives 
conuete and precise definitions on the amount and type 
of evidence needed to corroborate the accomplice's testi-
mony. 
In State v. Petralia, 118 Utah 171, 221 P. 2d 873 
( 1950), Petralia, along with three others, was accused of 
grand larceny. One of the accused confessed and impli-
cated Petralia. The lower court found Petralia gurilty and 
he appealed to the Supreme Court of Utah claiming insuf-
ficient evidence of corroboration of the testimony of an 
admitted accomplice under Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-8 
(1953). The Supreme Court found there was sufficient 
independent evidence to connect and implicate Petralia to 
the crime and based rit on three findings of evidence: 
1. A police officer testified that he saw the de-
fendant in Ogden on June 24, the night the plans for 
the robbery were made, while defendant claimed to be 
in California. 
2. Defendant admitted to a third party that he 
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was involved in the crime and gave the victim back 
some of the money claimed stolen. 
3. Defendant's own witness testified that Jefen-
dant had asked someone to testify to seeing him in 
California before he was even accused of participation 
in the crime. 
The independent evidence in the instant case is almost 
exactly the same as the Petralia case. 
1. Petralia made an excuse to his whereabouts 
on the night :t:Jhe robbery was planned. Baran, the de-
fendant in this case, testified that on the night of the 
robbery he spentt most the evening from 10 :00 to 
12 :20 p.m .. aJt hi':S girl friend's house. Petralia's excuse 
was in direct conflici with a police officer's testimony, 
- so was Baran's. Baran swore that he was at West-
overs from 10 :00-11 :20 p.m. Yet, Police Officer Paul 
Rogers testified that he saw 1the in the Salt 
Lake Oity Police Starbion the night of the robbery at 
11 :00 p.m., exactly when he was supposed to be over 
at Westovers (T. 223). 
2. Petralia admitted to a third person that he 
had coonmitted the crime. The appellant, in this case, 
did exacitly rthe same thing. He told Miss Carmelita 
Burke that he and others had committed the robbery. 
Baran, like PetraJlia, admitted taking part the 
robbery Ito a third party. 
3. Petra:Ua was worried about being convicted of 
the crime before he was ever accused. Baran had the 
7 
same reaction and even bet his girl friend $5.00 that 
the police would accuse him of the crime - rthen testi-
fied in court that he never thought the bet was very 
funny (T. 197). Respondent admits the night of the 
bet with his girl friend was in doubt - but the fact 
that appellant was worried about the police accusiing 
him of the crime before he was charged is the import-
ant element. 
Appellant, ( 1) had a police officer testify exactly 
opposite to what his excuse was the night of the robbery, 
(2) told a third party that he had committed the crime, and 
(3) was worried about being apprehended for the crime 
before he was ever accused. This is the same type of in-
dependent evidence found in Petralia ,fu.at implicated and 
connected Petralia to the crime. The burden of proof un-
der the Petralia decision was met in this case. 
In State v. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 382 P. 2d 407 
(1963), defendant was convicted of assault with intent to 
commit murder and robbery. He appealed the case on 
grounds that there was no corroboration of accomplice's 
testimony. The court held there was sufficient independent 
evidence to implicwte and connect appellant with the crime 
because, appellant ( 1) admitted his presence in ,foe itiown 
of Bridgeland alt the time of the incident, (2) a shotgun 
and nylon stocking were found along the route taken by the 
trio after leaving the scene, and (3) an independent wit-
ness testified that the defendant admitted to ihim 'that he 
shot a man with a shotgun in Utah. 
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Similar independent facts were present in the Baran 
case. (1) Two different people testified that Ba,.:::1 w;::: 
with the robbers both before and after the crime, (2) a 
third party tastified that Baran admitted to her that he 
took part in the robbery, and (3) the police found the stolen 
wallets along the supposed route of the robbers after the 
robbery, plus finding the nylon stockings in the getaway 
car. 
As held in State v. Petralia, supra, pg. ----· 
"Evidence sufficiently corroborated testimony 
of accomplice to susita:in conviction of grand lar-
ceny." Id. at 876. 
The present case also had evidence sufficient to corroborate 
the testimony of the accomplice to .sustain the conviction 
of robbery. 
The a:bove mentioned independent facts would be 
enough to convict appellant, but there are other facts which 
overwhelmingly indicate appellant's guilt. The appellant 
was seen with the two other robbers earlier in the night 
(T. 56). The appellant worked at the gas station before 
the robbery (T. 60); the manager testified that a person 
would have to know something about the cash regi.ster to 
get it open (T. 61); they found silk stockings in the stolen 
getaway car (T. 65); and Mrs. Rose, an innocent party, 
tified that appellant came to her house after the robbery 
with money and some stolen wallets he wanted to get rid 
of (T. 68, 69). All of these are independent facts which 
implicate and connect the appellant to the crime. 
T,aJcen together, they ·are more than sufficient to cor-
roborate the accomplice's testinH,llj' and hold appellant 
guilty of the crime. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT co.:VIMIT ERROR IN 
PERMITTING PROSECUTION TO INT R 0 -
DUCE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR 
GUILTY FINDINGS IN A MISDEMEANOR 
CASE AND OF OTHER CRIMES. 
The appellant is contending that evidence 1was admitted 
at the trial which tended to show that he was guilty of 
other crimes. He feels that this evidence was inadmissible 
and resulted in prejudicial error. He cites the examples of: 
theft of radio, taking of pennies, conspiring to rob a thewtre 
and a cafe, stealing a car, and a misdemeanor charge of 
destruction of property. 
Appellant cites several cases which he claims support 
his point, but a careful reading shows that at least one of 
these cases holds exactly opposite to appellant's point. 
State v. Kappas, 100 Utah 274, 114 P. 2d 205 (1941), 
which appellant relies on, held: 
"* * * and tha!t proof of his commission of 
other unconnected crimes must be excluded, is sub-
ject to exception permitting proof of identification 
of accused, motive, intent, p"lan or knowledge * * * 
and to exception permitting showing to be made 
that offense charged was part of common scheme 
which may include one or more other offenses." Id. 
at 278. (Emphasis added.) 
Later that same holding was 1affirmed in State v. 
Montayne, 18 Utah 2d 38, 414 P. 2d 958, cert. denied, 385 
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U.S. 939 (1966) when the court stated: 
"Testimony which established that defendant 
had embezzled or stolen automobile which he was 
driving a,t time of his arrest wa>S relevant to is.su<.:! 
of whether defendant had sitanding to object to un-
lawful search and seizure and also :tended '!Jo show 
a scheme or plan assooia:ted with charged crime of 
robbery, and such testimony was admissable not-
withstanding contention !that lit tended to prove 
commission of another unrelated crime." Id. at 960. 
The a:lleged crimes brought up in court, except the 
misdemea.nor charge, were all part of a common scheme -
thus, under State v. Kappas and State v. Montayne, supra, 
they aTe clearly an exception and therefore admissible in 
court. 
Appellant has shown no grounds for prejudice. Utah 
law indicates thwt crimes which are part of a common 
scheme, show intent, plans or knowledge, are exceptions to 
the rule of nonadmissibility. All of the crimes appellant 
alleged, except a misdemeanor, clearly fall within the ex-
ception to the rule and are admissible in court. 
The admission of ithe misdemeanor is harmless, and lin 
no way could lead a courit to believe i 1t was prejudicial error 
againsJt the defendant. 
POINT III. 
IF THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE 
EVIDENCE COMPLAINED OF, IT WAS NOT 
PREJUDICIAL. 
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The general rule is set forth in Section 77-42-1, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, to-wit: 
"After hearing an appeal the court must 
give judgment without regard to errors or de-
fects which do not affect the substantial rights of 
the parties. If error has been committed, it shall 
not be presumed to have resulted in prejudice. 'Dhe 
court must be satisfied that it haB that effedt before 
it is warranted in reversing the judgment." 
"Erroneous admission of evidence does not call for re-
versal of the judgment where the guilt of the accused is 
otherwise satisfactorily proved," State v. Cox, 74 Utah 
149, 277 P. 972 (1929). "It must be shown ,that the naturail 
effect of the error is to do harm and affect the subsitantial 
rights of the parties," State v. Dodge, 12 Utah 2d 293, 
365 P. 2d 798 (1961). 
In State v. Lyman, 10 Utah 2d 58, 348 P. 2d 340 
( 1960), the legislature intended by the statute that cases 
should not be reversed unless the alleged error prejudicially 
affected the substantial rights of the parties and that prej-
udice sh'ould not be presumed but must ,be shown. Id. at 
342. 
We submit that in the instant case the error, iif the 
Court determines that such is the case, did not effeot the 
substantial rights of ithe party because the guilt of the 
accused was ce11ainly satisfactorily proved and the alleged 
prejudicial errors would have no effect on the outcome. 
POINT IV. 
DEFENDANT WAS GIVEN A FAIR AND IM-
PARTIAL TRIAL. 
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Appellant claims he was denied a fair and impartial 
trial. To support thi·S he lists a vast a1·,·2,y of alleged errors 
by the court. However, there are three reaS'ons why appel-
lant's contention that the court committed prejudicial error 
was wrong. The first is when appellant states (contrary 
to Utah case law), "hardly any of these errors alone would 
justify a new trial, but taken together * * * the jury 
could not help but have been influenced and prejudiced 
* '·' * " Appellant's Brief, pg. 33 (Emphasis added.) In 
State v. Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P. 2d 973 (1947), the 
court held exactly opposite to what appellant is advocating. 
The Court stated: 
"Where none of specified en·or relied on by 
appellant constitutes reversible error, combination 
of such errors does not constitute prejudicial error, 
unless some error, in combination with other factors 
creates prejudice." Id. at 979. (Emphasis added.) 
Appellant has merely stated the errors, showing no 
combination with other factors. Under the holding of State 
v. Moore, supra, "there was no combination of other fac-
tors" and hence rro prejudicial error, thus, giving Baran a 
fair and impartial trfa:l. 
Secondly, appellant's list of alleged errors are all con-
dusions. He failed to show why the list of errors consti-
tuted prejudice. In State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 P. 
388 (1957), the court stated, "The Supreme Court is not 
allowed to presume prejudice from mere error." Id. at 392. 
Later, in State v. Lyman, 10 Utah 2d 58, 348 P. 2d 340 
(1960), the court said, "* * * and that prejudice 
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should not be presumed but must be shown." Id. at 342. 
I, the pr&<Sent case no prejudicial error was shown. The 
appellant w1•ote a large lid of conclusions and left it :to 
the court to presume prejudice - contrary to Utah law. 
Third, none of the alleged errors on their face is suf-
ficient to prove significant 01· sulYstantial prejudice. (See 
also Point III of this brief.) 
State V. Seymoul', 18 Utah 2d 153, 417 P. 2d 655 
(1966) held: 
"There should be no dismissal of charge nor 
reversal of judgment unless there was significant 
failure or abuse of due process of law, or unless 
there was error or defect which it could reasonably 
be supposed put defendant ait some substantial dis-
advantage or had substantial prejudicial effect upon 
his rights." Id. at 156. 
The Utah courts hold that the prejudice must be sub-
stantial or significant; most were mere eiTors in court 
which every trial is bound to have. As stated in State v. 
Hamilton, 18 Utah 2d 234, 419 P. 2d 770 (1966) : 
"The purpose of the law and of the rules of 
procedure is not only to safeguard the rights of an 
accused, but also to see that the guilty are brought 
to jus1Jice." Id. at 772. 
Appellant did not receive a perfect trial - no one has; 
however, he did receive a fair and impartial one. 
As stated ,in Harvey v. United States, 306 F. 2d 523, 
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 911 (1962), "A defendant is entiUed 
to a fair trial but not a perfect one." 
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See also State v. Ingle, 64 Warsh. 2d 491, 392 P. 2d 442 
(1964). 
Because appellant is arguing a point contmry to Utah 
law, stating nothing but conclusions, and allegiing errors 
that are not prejudicial on their face, the errors com-
piJ.Mned of do not constitute violation of defendant's right 
to a fair and impartial tl'ial. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR IN ITS SELECTION OF THE 
JURY. 
The court foiJilOlwed Utah 'laws and procedure when 
choosing :bhe jury and therefore was not prejudicial in its 
selooti!on. S'ection 77-30-18 orf Utaih Code Ann. 1953 states 
on what basis a juror can be di•squalified. It reads: 
"A particular cause for challenge is : ( 1) For 
such bias as, when tthe existence of the facts is as-
certained, in judgment of law disqualified the 
juror, and which is known in this Code as implied 
bias. 
"(2) For the existence of a state of mind on 
the part of the juror which to a juist inference 
in reference to the ,case ithat he will not act with 
entire impartiality, wMch is known in this Code as 
actual bias." 
Under this code section rthere must be some type of 
l»as to disqualify a juror. 
15 
The judge in examining the jury was very explicit in 
rletermining whether or not each of the potential jury mem-
bus was biased. On several occasions he a1sked the jury 
whether or not they were biased. On no occasion did any 
juror indicate they were biased. 
Appellianrt puts great stress on the fact that eight of rthe 
potential jurors had been robbed; one W::l.'.S a neighbor of 
appellant's wife, and two of them had read about apJ)€1-
lant's prior case. Of the final eight members of the jury, 
the neighbor of appellant's w:ife was omitted, and f,ive of ithe 
eight that had been robbed were omitted. Of the three on 
the jury who had been robbed, one robbery happened ten 
years ago, and another was not actually robbed - it ,was 
her husband's store which had been robbed. Only one of 
the two which had read about the pf!ior caS'e was on the 
jury. All eight of those selected indicated in the affirma-
tive that they were in no way biased against the Appellant. 
Utah case law points out that there is no bias if each 
juror states he is impartial and will rtry defendant accord-
ing to instructions. In State v. Musser, 110 Utah 534, 175 
P. 2d 724 ( 1946) , the court held : 
"On trial of information charging conspiracy 
to induce others to practice polygamous or plural 
marriages, charge of bias on part of members of 
Mormon church called to serve on the jury were 
not substantiated, where ea:ch said that he would 
try case according to the evidence and court's in-
structions. Nor could defendant object to jurors 
who had knowledge that said defendants had been 
excommunicated from Mormon church for advocat-
16 
ing or practicing polygamy, where such info1·mation 
was conveyed to jury by their own attorneys." Id. 
at 738. 
In State v. Convey, 23 Wash. 2d 539, 161 P. 2d 442 
(1945), there was no prejudice or bias found even when 
a juror told a third party before trial that he did not like 
the accused and seemed very antagonistic towards him. 
The court held: 
"Where prospective juror testified on prelim-
inary examination that his acquaintance with ac-
·cused or his family would not weigh with juror and 
that he knew no reason why he could not act as fair 
and impartial juror, whereupon he was passed by 
accused's counsel for cause, affidavit that such 
juror told affiant before trial that juror did not 
like accused and seemed very antagonistic to him 
was insufficient to entitle accused to new trial, in 
absence of any suggestion in record that such juror 
was influenced in his verdict by any prejudice 
against accused." Id. at 446. 
The lower court judge did everything necessary to 
insure a fair and unbiased jury. As indicated by statute 
and case law, appellant has no grounds to allege the jury 
was prejudicial - on the contrary, all past law indicates 
and affirms appellant, Mr. Baran, had a fair and impartial 
jury. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent respectfully submits that the convic-
tion Slhould be affirmed. The appellant, Mr. Baran, had a 
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fair trial, the conviction was rendered by an imparitial and 
jury, and rthe evidence supports the finding. Based 
on cases cited and reasoning herein of the a:bove statemenlts, 
the lower court conviiction should be upheld. 
Respeotfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
.Attorney General 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
Chief Assistant 
Attorney Genera:! 
Attorneys for Respondent 
